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Abstract
Reverse Code Engineering (RCE) to detect anti-debugging techniques in software is
a very diﬃcult task. Code obfuscation is an anti-debugging technique makes detection
even more challenging. The Rule Engine Detection by Intermediate Representation
(REDIR) system for automated static detection of obfuscated anti-debugging techniques
is a prototype designed to help the RCE analyst improve performance through this tedious
task. Three tenets form the REDIR foundation. First, Intermediate Representation (IR)
improves the analyzability of binary programs by reducing a large instruction set down
to a handful of semantically equivalent statements. Next, an Expert System (ES) rule-
engine searches the IR and initiates a sensemaking process for anti-debugging technique
detection. Finally, an IR analysis process conﬁrms the presence of an anti-debug technique.
The REDIR system is implemented as a debugger plug-in. Within the debugger, REDIR
interacts with a program in the disassembly view. Debugger users can instantly highlight
anti-debugging techniques and determine if the presence of a debugger will cause a
program to take a conditional jump or fall through to the next instruction.
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REDIR: AUTOMATED STATIC DETECTION OF OBFUSCATED
ANTI-DEBUGGING TECHNIQUES
I. Introduction
1.1 Research Motivation
Reverse Code Engineering (RCE) is the process of analyzing binary programs without
access to source code. Tasks such as malware analysis and software security auditing
depend heavily on RCE [37]. However, RCE a time-consuming and complicated task that
involves understanding computer hardware and software operations, low-level languages
and logical analysis [25, 34]. RCE tools are available to help the human reverse engineer
manage the complexity and facilitate the analysis process. However, anti-RCE practices
can disrupt the use of RCE tools and techniques. These anti-RCE techniques complicate
analysis eﬀorts and are most prevalent in programs such as malware [45].
1.2 Problem Statement
Anti-debugging is a form of anti-RCE that attempts to prevent a debugger from
properly executing the program without intervention from the engineer. With enough skill
and experience, the reverse engineer can continue the RCE task with well-placed anti-
debugging mitigation techniques. However, regularly during RCE, obfuscations conceal
the anti-debugging techniques and make the diﬃcult task of RCE even more challenging.
A great deal of experience is required to circumvent obfuscated anti-debugging techniques
eﬃciently. RCE analysts would beneﬁt from a tool that could quickly identify obfuscated
anti-debugging techniques for eﬃcient mitigation.
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1.3 Research Objectives
The purpose of this research is to establish the feasibility of a system for detecting
obfuscated anti-debugging techniques in programs. To achieve this goal, a debugger
plug-in was developed to statically analyze binary programs to detect these techniques.
Debugger users will launch the detection process from within the debugger and view the
implemented technique in the disassembly view. The lines of code that comprise the
technique will be highlighted for the user. The process for detecting these obfuscated
anti-debugging techniques will follow a sensemaking theory for information gathering and
understanding.
1.4 Approach
The Rule Engine Detection by Intermediate Representation (REDIR) system for
automated static detection of obfuscated anti-debugging techniques is a prototype designed
help the RCE analyst quickly, and correctly, avoid anti-debugging techniques.
Sensemaking oﬀers a theory that allows for the development of minimal information
into a complete information gathering task [51]. Employing a sensemaking strategy, the
initial technique detections from a rule-based system is developed through a process that
will discard false detections and promote possible detection candidates. To develop these
candidates, an Intermediate Representation (IR) tool translates programs into the IR’s
simpliﬁed language, create small sub-programs to encapsulate the technique, and conduct
evaluations to determine if the addition of simulated debugging conditions will cause the
chop to terminate with a diﬀerent outcome.
REDIR relies on several principles to aﬀord identiﬁcation of obfuscated, anti-
debugging techniques. Based on the Data/Frame sensemaking process, REDIR develops
minimal starting information into a conﬁrmed detection [51]. First, the Binary Analysis
Platform (BAP) Framework translates the program into an IR that converts the Intel
Architecture, 32-bit (IA-32) instruction set down to a much smaller set of semantically
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equivalent statements [23]. Next, the IR is parsed into an Expert System (ES) rule-engine to
search the IR for instances of any anti-debugging technique characteristics. These minimal
characteristics are IR statements that represent the beginning and ending of a technique
based on minimal and unavoidable heuristics. The IR results from the rule-engine form
the bounds for chopping the program down to a small sub-program of IR statements.
An instrumentation process then adds code to simulate a debugging condition in the IR
chop. Finally, concrete evaluation by taint analysis of the instrumented IR chop reveals the
presence of the technique.
Unlike other solutions to detect these techniques, REDIR is static. Similar methods
for detection use dynamic instruction traces to determine the presence of the desired code
feature [46, 75]. Additionally, these methods report detections but do not oﬀer them back
for analysis. Conversely, REDIR will highlight the detected anti-debugging technique in
the debugger disassembly view.
1.5 Research Limitations
Testing a tool for detecting anti-debugging techniques involves one of two test
strategies. The ﬁrst strategy involves using real-world programs such as malware to
evaluate if it can detect the anti-debugging technique. The problem with this strategy is
that there are no existing test data sets that are statically analyzable and guaranteed to
implement the anti-debugging techniques under test. The second strategy involves creating
test data. The problem with this strategy is that tests conducted on these programs are not
guaranteed to work on real programs.
For this research, a test corpus was created to combine known anti-debugging
techniques with common obfuscations. Two key considerations drove this decision. First,
the techniques implemented in the test corpus derive from documented implementations
found in real-world programs. Second, even if these speciﬁc implementation combinations
do not exist in real-world malware, this research did not intended to search for
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speciﬁc implementations. The goal of this research is to ﬁnd the anti-debugging
technique, regardless of implementation. Finding the various anti-debugging technique
implementations contained in the test corpus attests to the feasibility of the system and the
potential ability to ﬁnd other unknown implementations.
1.6 Thesis Overview
This thesis proposes a method for static detection of obfuscated anti-debugging
techniques based on a rule engine sensemaking process with the aid of IR. Chapter 2
reviews the concepts and technologies that contribute to this research ranging from an
exploration of RCE concepts, through ES technologies, sensemaking and ﬁnally on to
related work. Chapter 3 describes the system design, implementation limitations and
testing methodology. Chapter 4 details the results of the REDIR analysis of the test corpus
including detailed analysis of six representative test cases. Lastly, Chapter 5 summarizes
this document and provides new research avenues based on this work.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The following sections provide the necessary background for the remainder of this
thesis. First, Section 2.2 provides an overview of Reverse Code Engineering (RCE)
knowledge, tools and techniques. Next, Section 2.3 presents a breakdown for the
various Expert System (ES) technologies. Then, Section 2.4 introduces the concept of
Intermediate Representation (IR) and the Binary Analysis Platform (BAP) framework.
Finally, Section 2.5 overviews similarities and diﬀerences of related works.
2.2 Overview of Reverse Code Engineering
RCE is the process of extracting details about a software program from the binary
executable. A number of motivations drive RCE such as reengineering of a system as a
whole, malware detection and analysis, and the “cracking” of copy protection. In order to
accomplish this work, engineers depend on resources that fall into three general categories:
knowledge, interface, and task. The following subsections provide a brief overview of each.
2.2.1 Knowledge
2.2.1.1 Assembly Language
Assembly language is the lowest-level programming language designed for human
comprehension [47]. Assembly is actually a set of mnemonics that describe machine
instructions processed by the Central Processing Unit (CPU). The ability to mentally
process disassembled application code is the root of the RCE process. Unfortunately for
reverse engineers, the assembly language outputs provided by disassemblers or debuggers
are not nearly as easy to comprehend as original source code [70]. These outputs do
not provide code comments or descriptive function names [47]. Assembly code does
not provide any details about higher-level data structures or variable types. Assembly
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instructions represent the low-level work of the processor. Data values move from memory
to registers and back. The processor manipulates pointers to control program ﬂow and store
data. Tools can convert these operators represented in the executable by binary zeroes and
ones into a slightly more readable format. The availability and functionality of operations
depends on the processor the code was compiled for. Additionally, the reverse engineer can
choose their preferred syntax for assembly code; x86 has Intel and American Telephone &
Telegraph (AT&T) syntaxes. For these reasons, assembly code is notoriously diﬃcult to
read and comprehend [70].
Listing 2.1 and Figure 2.1 provide two diﬀerent representations of a simple Hello
World C program. Listing 2.1 shows a simple Hello World C program written in C. The
exact same program in Figure 2.1 is shown disassembled in IDA Pro. This representation
is much longer and far more unreadable than Listing 2.1.
1 #include <stdio.h>
2 main()
3 {
4 printf("Hello World !\n");
5 }
Listing 2.1: helloworld.c: Hello World C program.
Furthermore, each assembly instruction can have many side eﬀects [23]. For example,
A simple XOR instruction, designed to implement an exclusive or (⊕) operation, has several.
Commonly, the instruction XOR EAX, EAX is used to zero-out the value of a register since,
for any value x, x⊕x = 0. In addition to the change of EAX, several control ﬂow ﬂags are also
changed. According to the Intel Architecture, 32-bit (IA-32) language documentation, the
XOR instruction can cause the “Overﬂow Flag (OF) and Carry Flag (CF) ﬂags are cleared;
the Sign Flag (SF), Zero Flag (ZF), and Parity Flag (PF) ﬂags are set according to the result.
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Figure 2.1: Portion of the compiled helloworld.c program in IDA Pro Dissembler.
The state of the Adjust Flag (AF) is undeﬁned” [7]. The reverse engineer must be aware of
the explicit assignment operation but also any side-eﬀects.
2.2.1.2 Explicit vs. Tacit Knowledge
Reverse engineering software requires the possession of a variety of skills and
knowledge. Some of these skills are precise and explicit such as the assembly language
syntax [49]. Explicit knowledge forms the foundation of the skill and can be acquired in a
classroom or from a book. Unfortunately, limited classroom opportunities are available for
such learning. However, automated tools can tackle problems based on explicit knowledge
to help the reverse engineer.
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Research suggests that some level of expertise in an activity can be developed in as
little as 50 hours of deliberate practice while world-class skill requires as much as 10,000
hours [36]. A reverse engineer’s tacit knowledge base grows as he or she progresses from
50 to 10,000 hours. Unlike explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge develops through practice.
Reverse engineers develop “rules of thumb” that guide them through the process [49].
Knowledge for cognitive support has not been formalized for the software engineering
discipline [73]. Individuals have created tools to aid cognition but only by the creators’
hands-on intuition rather than scientiﬁc principle. Tacit knowledge disciplines, like RCE,
fall into the category of craft discipline. As disciplines progress, they transform their tacit
knowledge base into explicit knowledge. Unfortunately for the ﬁeld of RCE, several issues
have slowed that progression [63].
2.2.1.3 Reverse Code Engineering as a Sensemaking Task
Psychologists describe sensemaking as a composite process that incorporates creativ-
ity, curiosity, comprehension, mental modeling and situational awareness [50]. Klein, et
al. describe sensemaking as a “motivated, continuous eﬀort to understand connections...in
order to anticipate their trajectories and act eﬀectively”. To be an eﬀective aid to sensemak-
ing, a joint human-Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) team must be “mutually predictable”, “di-
rectable” and share a “common ground” (understanding) of the domain and problem [52].
Bryant, et al. identiﬁed the process of analyzing a program executable as an example
of a sensemaking process that occurs between a human and a system [25]. To be eﬀective,
a joint human-AI RCE team must be able to accomplish several key goals. First, they must
establish predictability by agreeing on a speciﬁc RCE workﬂow. Next, they must give and
take direction by either learning or applying learned RCE knowledge. Finally, the team
must share a common view of the problem. This view should resemble an artifact of the
RCE process [70].
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Klein, et al. introduce the Data/Frame sensemaking theory as a process where
understanding develops through a transition between frames [51]. These frames form into
a closed loop encompassing the life of the sensemaking task (see Figure: 2.2). Frames are
created based on only minimal data. Through a process of questioning, elaborating, and
reframing, the frame is reﬁned for the life of the task.
Figure 2.2: Klein, et al. Data/Frame sensemaking theory [51].
2.2.2 Interface
2.2.2.1 Compilers
Compilers are responsible for converting higher-level code written by programmers
into the executable ﬁles of machine instructions [13]. Compiler design strives to achieve the
best possible performance and have considerable inﬂuence over how a program converts
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into machine instructions. The optimizer works to reduce the processor cycles required
for a series of instructions by reordering and replacing the instructions. Compilers
will remove redundant calculations, move code out of loops, and reorder instructions as
necessary. Additionally, there are numerous, processor dependent, implementations of
these optimization schemes. Often these optimizations result in assembly code that is non-
intuitive and diﬃcult for the human reverse engineer to understand.
2.2.2.2 Common Reverse Code Engineering Tools
2.2.2.2.1 System Monitors As programs execute they act upon the
system aﬀecting memory use, network access, hard disk access, and other functions or
resources [34]. System monitors can observe the interaction between the program and the
operating system. Reverse engineers can use system monitors to analyze the behavior of
the program they are analyzing to determine what the program does or if it acts maliciously.
2.2.2.2.2 Disassemblers Disassemblers are the most basic and essential
reverse engineer tools [34]. Disassemblers work by transforming the binary instructions
of a program into their assembly language representations. Disassemblers are processor
speciﬁc; however more capable disassemblers support a variety of processor architectures.
2.2.2.2.3 Debuggers Debuggers step through an application, line by
line, to give the user a view of a program while it is executing [34]. Reverse engineers
can use debuggers to pause code execution with breakpoints and trace instructions in a
program. Debuggers include simple disassemblers to allow the reverse engineer to watch
the code as it is processed by the CPU.
2.2.2.2.4 Decompilers A Decompiler can convert the executable back
into a higher-level language that resembles the original source code [34]. In most
circumstances, decompilers cannot reverse the entire program. With their limitations,
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decompilers still ﬁnd use in RCE. Even if the decompilation attempt is partly successful,
the result can provide information that will save the reverse engineer time and eﬀort.
2.2.3 Task
2.2.3.1 Anti-Reverse Engineering Software Design
Software design plays a major role in the eﬀort required of reverse engineers. The
designers of proprietary software and malware employ tactics to disrupt the reverse
engineering of their code [67]. Simple but eﬀective techniques include using encryption
and compression to occupy the reverse engineer’s time and eﬀort. More sophisticated
techniques like those listed below make the engineer’s work quite diﬃcult.
2.2.3.2 Encryption and Compression
To avoid detection, malware writers can encrypt or compress data portions of the code
as a form of obfuscation [45]. Searching data sections for clues becomes diﬃcult as a result.
To learn the function of the software, reverse engineers must manually de-obfuscate each
data area. This manual process can become quite time consuming and tedious. Automating
the de-obfuscation is possible with debuggers that can step through the code, decrypting
or decompressing as they go. Unfortunately, malware designers can use anti-debugging
techniques in conjunction with encryption and compression to counter the use of debuggers.
2.2.3.3 Anti-debugging
Unlike disassembly which analyzes static executables, debuggers look at the code
as it is executing. Unfortunately for reverse engineers, debuggers can be fooled with
simple tricks [67]. Calls to system interrupts can force the debugger to lose context while
analyzing. To detect debuggers, the program can generate checksums for portions of code
as they exist in the execution stack. The breakpoints inserted by the debugger add to
the checksum calculation and the mismatch becomes easily detectable. Debuggers also
often save a trace record to the stack. Analyzing the stack at certain points in execution
can reveal part of this trace to the program. Simple anti-debugging techniques include
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using speciﬁc Application Programming Interfaces (API), checking the debugger’s registry
values, searching memory for speciﬁc debugger strings (e.g. “Ollydbg”), or scanning for
the particular drivers used by debuggers. The following techniques are debugger-agnostic
examples of anti-debugging possible in user-level code.
2.2.3.3.1 Operating System Flags The easiest method to detect if a de-
bugger is in use is to look for speciﬁc ﬂags set by the Operating System (OS) [45]. These
ﬂags are normally made available through invocation of the 32-Bit Windows API calls
isDebuggerPresent() or isRemoteDebuggerPresent(). Additionally, these OS ﬂags
can be checked manually. The code in Listing 2.2 checks for a debugger by looking at the
Process Execution Block (PEB) for the byte used by isDebuggerPresent().
1 mov eax , fs:[30h]
2 movzx eax , byte ptr [eax+2]
3 test eax ,eax
4 jne DebuggerFound
Listing 2.2: IA-32 implementation example of manually testing the PEB
isDebuggerPresent byte.
2.2.3.3.2 Timing Another method for detecting the presence of a debug-
ger is to use a timing comparison. By checking the time twice, once before and again after
code segment, the program can detect if its execution was delayed. The code in Listing 2.3
demonstrates a timing-based detection technique using the IA-32 rdtcs instruction which
returns the number of processor cycles since startup.
1 rdtsc
2 xor ecx , ecx
3 add ecx , eax
4 rdtsc
5 sub eax , ecx
6 mov ecx , 0FFFh
7 cmp eax , ecx
8 ja DebuggerFound
Listing 2.3: IA-32 implementation example of RDTSC Timing detection technique.
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2.2.3.3.3 Interrupt Handling Interrupt handling techniques are very ef-
fective since they prey upon the debugger’s handling of the interrupt and the user’s incom-
plete understanding of the underlying operations [38, 45]. These techniques attempt to
have the debugger change the data stored in ﬂags and registers or act inappropriately. The
“move stack segment” (MOV SS) technique is interesting because when a value is set to
the Stack Segment (SS) register, the CPU will covertly set the Trap Flag (TF) in a special,
multi-purpose data structure known as the EFLAGS register. Next, while debugging, the
CPU will advance the Stack Pointer (ESP) and the debugger will clear the ﬂag [34, 38].
While single stepping over the instruction, the debugger will seem to skip to the next in-
struction. This is because the TF will disable the debugger’s next single step interrupt. If
that next instruction happens to persist the TF by pushing it onto the stack, the value is
preserved and used later to direct control ﬂow. Testing the TF will inform the program that
the debugger cleared the TF. In Listing 2.4 the pop SS instruction covertly sets the TF. The
pushfd instruction then pushes the EFLAGS image onto the stack. Now, the TF is available
at any time for use in a control-ﬂow decision.
1 push ss
2 pop ss
3 pushfd
4 test word ptr [esp+1], 1
5 jne DebuggerFound
Listing 2.4: IA-32 implementation example of the MOV SS detection technique.
2.2.3.4 Obfuscation
If malware authors all wrote malware the same way, the job of analyzing malware
would be quite easy. To make analyzing programs more diﬃcult, obfuscation techniques
can disguise the true nature of a program.
2.2.3.4.1 Layout Obfuscation Layout obfuscation techniques attempt to
confuse the analyst by concealing important instructions among other irrelevant instruc-
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tions [56]. Simple techniques include insertion of dead code (nop and other non-functional
instructions) between the functional instructions [76]. Reassigning registers between code
segments can further disrupt the analyst. The example shown in Listing 2.5 is the same
program from Listing 2.2 with the instructions reordered in a process called code transpo-
sition. The use of labels makes this example easy to comprehend. When displayed in a
debugger (see Figure 2.3) this code is more diﬃcult to read.
1 jmp step1
2 step3:
3 test eax ,eax
4 jmp step4
5 step2:
6 movzx eax , byte ptr [eax+2]
7 jmp step3
8 step4:
9 jne DebuggerFound
10 jmp end
11 step1:
12 mov eax , fs:[30h]
13 jmp step2
Listing 2.5: IA-32 implementation example of manually testing the PEB
isDebuggerPresent byte with code transposition applied.
Figure 2.3: Program from Listing 2.5 as displayed in DigR Debugger.
2.2.3.4.2 Conditional Code Obfuscation Conditional code obfuscation
techniques hide the intended execution paths of programs [66]. The strength of these
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techniques is that static analysis becomes very diﬃcult as no one true execution path is
detectable; dummy code presents a valid execution path.
One such method of conditional code obfuscation is an opaque predicate [29]. Here,
the predicate (cause for some control ﬂow decision) is unknown. The opaque predicate is
expressible in terms of predicate P and program p. The predicate can evaluate always true
PTp , always false P
F
p , or neither P
?
p if it does not always point the same direction.
For example, observe Listing 2.6. This is an example of a PTp opaque predicate. This
program employs the algebraic identity (x+ y)2 = x2 + 2xy+ y2 to form a number-theoretic
opaque predicate which always evaluates true [18]. As a result, 26 lines of code have dis-
guised a single unconditional jump. A human reverse engineer would require additional
time to analyze this jump and a static analysis tool would likely be unable to determine the
correct jump direction, especially if x and y were runtime variables. It is also important to
note that applying other obfuscations to an opaque predicate will make analysis more diﬃ-
cult. A human reverse engineer would not likely see the entire algorithm laid out neatly for
analysis.
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1 xor eax , eax
2 add ax, x
3 add ax, y
4 imul ax , ax
5 push ax ; push (x+y)ˆ2
6 xor eax , eax
7 mov ax, x
8 imul ax , ax
9 push ax ; push xˆ2
10 xor eax , eax
11 mov ax, y
12 imul ax , ax
13 push ax ; push yˆ2
14 xor eax , eax
15 xor ebx , ebx
16 mov ax, x
17 mov bx, y
18 imul ax , bx
19 imul ax , 2 ; ax = 2xy
20 pop bx ; bx = yˆ2
21 add ax, bx ; ax = 2xy + yˆ2
22 pop bx ; bx = xˆ2
23 add ax, bx ; ax = xˆ2 + 2xy + yˆ2
24 pop bx ; bx = (x+y)ˆ2
25 cmp ax, bx ; always evaluates true: ax == bx
26 jne fake ; never jumps
Listing 2.6: IA-32 implementation example of a PTp number-theoretic opaque
predicate.
2.2.3.5 Anti-heuristics
Heuristic analysis is a tool used by reverse engineers to detect viruses based on their
similarity to other known viruses [67]. Many viruses use “packers” to package their
virus together with a harmless executable to conceal its presence Figure 2.4 depicts an
executable program packed within a Windows Portable Executable (PE) ﬁle [62, 69].
While packed, the concealed portion of the code is encrypted, encoded, or obfuscated to
hide its implementation. The packer works by revealing the concealed code as necessary
to execute it. Additionally, malware packers employ the other anti-reverse engineering
tactics mentioned previously to make unpacking diﬃcult. Malware analysts must carefully
unpack the executable by defeating the anti-reverse engineering techniques to discover the
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ﬁrst instruction for the program known as the Original Entry Point (OEP) of the unpacked
malware.
Typically, once the OEP of the malware has been identiﬁed, the program is dumped
from memory into an unpacked executable for further analysis. To hide from heuristic
analysis, virus writers now use sophisticated packers that can embed malware deep within
virtually any ﬁle format. Nesting viruses deep within a tree of executables, compressed
archives and data ﬁles complicates heuristic methods. Furthermore, virus writers will pack
multiple executable sections (including multiple viruses) into an executable to hide the true
entry point of the program from the analyzer.
Figure 2.4: Portable Executable (PE) depicted with embedded packed executable [62, 69].
2.2.3.6 Mutation
As anti-virus technology has progressed, the work of hiding malware has become
more diﬃcult. As a result, malware developers have developed mutation techniques to
avoid detection. Encrypted viruses use variable decryption schemes to insert dummy
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instructions in the code [67]. These instructions make a previously known sample appear
new. Oligomorphic techniques increase the complexity of encrypted viruses by adding
additional decryptors to the virus. An oligomorphic virus would randomly select from
the available decryptors at runtime adding to the possible variations. Polymorphic viruses
include mutating decryptors that are capable of creating millions of unique virus samples.
Metamorphic viruses on the other hand swap modules around within the executable
creating new forms. Metamorphic viruses have the ability to create n! permutations (for
n subroutines). A simple metamorphic virus, Badboy, contained eight subroutines for
8! = 40, 320 permutations.
2.3 Expert Systems Overview
Research in the ﬁeld of AI has spanned many decades and created numerous
foundational technologies [55]. ES have become a cornerstone of AI research and
implementation. The concept behind an ES is simple: transfer knowledge of a particular
domain from a Subject Matter Expert (SME) to a computer system. Once in the system,
this knowledge can ﬁnd a variety of uses. The typical ES is composed of three parts: a
knowledge base, a working memory and an inference engine [31]. The knowledge base is
simply the storage place for the expert knowledge. The working memory stores the details
of the current problem including the user input and program inferences. The inference
engine performs the work of leveraging the knowledge base against the working memory
to learn new information about the situation.
Many variations of the original ES exist. For the remainder of this paper, more speciﬁc
variations are discussed and evaluated instead of the generic ES. Furthermore, while these
technologies are unique, they are not mutually exclusive. Many applications are hybrids of
ES technologies. Figure 2.5 provides an illustrative overview of ES.
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Figure 2.5: ES overview.
2.3.1 Intelligent Tutoring Systems
An Intelligent Tutoring System (ITS) is designed to use AI to provide an education
or tutoring experience for a student [60]. ITS can be characterized by an ES knowledge
module like a rule-based or knowledge-based system packaged with a student model, a
tutoring module and a user interface. The student module maintains a representation of
the student’s understanding based on his or her progress through the lesson. This student
information is fed to the tutoring module as the basis for speciﬁc tutoring decisions. The
tutoring module works by dividing lessons into a series of tasks and steps (see Figure
2) [72]. An outer loop selects tasks by one of four methods: student selected, ﬁxed
progression, mastery of lesson knowledge or macroadaptive (adapted based on student
performance). The sequence of steps in the inner loop derives from the student and tutoring
module’s determination for the most eﬀective learning. The inner loop is where the tutoring
module determines the amount of feedback and assistance to provide. When called, the
Step Generator returns the next step for the student to perform. Other interpretations of
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ITS systems contain additional modules such as the domain expert model that represents
the ideal solution model and the bug catalog which lists common domain errors and
misconceptions [30]. Figure 2.6 provides an illustration of an ITS.
Figure 2.6: Illustration of an ITS [72].
ITS systems have already proved useful in instructional settings [61]. They are well
suited for basic skill instruction where the student knows how to ask the appropriate
questions. Domains with well-deﬁned problem spaces have the most positive impact from
ITS. These systems still have only had limited success due to sensory limitations. ITS
systems have only begun to factor in other measurements of the student beyond keyboard
inputs such as eye movement and vocalization monitoring. Human tutors can quickly detect
a student’s lack of interest, frustration or boredom [22]. ITS systems will have limited
impact until the emotional state of the student adequately incorporates into the system [61].
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ITS systems have been used in several computer science domains [55]. The lessons
learned from creating tutoring systems for teaching the LISP programming language,
enhancing cognition and teaching Structured Query Language (SQL) programming could
inspire future RCE ITS [16, 17, 58].
2.3.2 Rule-Based Expert Systems
Rule-based ES are designed to codify knowledge provided by SMEs based on an
easy to understand syntax [55]. This knowledge forms rules that are expressible in if-
then syntax. Rule-based systems are composed of three parts: the working memory, rule
base and the inference engine [65]. The working memory maintains the current state of
situation based on a known set of facts. The rule base (knowledge base) provides the
complete knowledge of the domain provided by the SME. The inference engine uses the
working memory and the rule base to learn new information about the problem.
Rule-based systems have several advantages over other AI systems. Rule-bases have
a uniform syntax such as ruleid: If antecedent1 and antecedent2 .... then
consequent. This syntax makes the rules self-documenting and easy to understand.
Rules are also independent since each rule represents one fact about a particular domain.
Additionally, rules can be prioritized to optimize processing. Finally, rules are useful as
computational models based on their programmatic syntax.
There are several disadvantages to rule-based ES as well. All rules exist on the same
level; they cannot be represented in a hierarchy. As a result, all rules cycle through before
selecting the appropriate rule. Rule-based systems also become tedious when representing
human problem solving as a single task breaks down into numerous atomic subtasks.
Rule-based systems have been used successfully in numerous domains [55]. Most
notably relating to RCE, rule-based systems have been used in teaching, knowledge base
maintenance, knowledge acquisition, knowledge representation and tutoring systems [28,
41, 42, 44, 74].
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2.3.3 Knowledge-Based Expert Systems
Similar to rule-based systems, knowledge-based ES can replicate limited human
knowledge provided by SME into a computer systems [55]. Typical knowledge-based
systems are characterized by four components: a knowledge base, an inference engine,
a knowledge engineering tool and a user interface. Unlike rule-based systems, knowledge-
based systems do not have a prescribed syntax. The purpose of the knowledge engineering
tool is to add knowledge to the system. This process can either be human directed or
automated [14]. The user interface in a knowledge-based system should provide, as natural
as possible, access to the knowledge stored in the system.
There are several advantages and disadvantages to using knowledge-based systems [20].
Advantages include the ability to make mostly inaccessible information widely available.
Additionally, the knowledge base serves to preserve the knowledge for the future. Unfor-
tunately, if the knowledge base has errors or is incorrect, that incorrect knowledge is also
preserved. In addition, the knowledge base does not contain the common sense or intuition
of the SME.
Knowledge-based AI approaches have been employed for decades. Many of those
applications have aspects that relate to creating a tool for RCE. Knowledge-based tools
have been applied in knowledge management, knowledge representation, decision -making
and learning [32, 57, 59].
2.3.4 Ontologies
Ontologies are vocabularies that provide a common communication domain model
between SMEs and software developers [55]. These vocabularies can be structured in
many ways from “highly informal,” like natural speech, to “rigorously formal” with
rigid semantics [71]. Ontologies are useful because they formalize domain knowledge
creating a shared understanding of a problem. Additionally, ontologies allow knowledge
reuse. Once the ontology is built, the knowledge base can port to tools or other problem
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domains. Unfortunately, ontology creation cannot be automated. The current process is
manual, time-consuming, and requires cooperation between domain experts and ontology
developers.
Use of ontologies is common in a number of domains. Several examples exist that
could have implications on RCE. Knowledge reuse, knowledge acquisition and knowledge
modeling activities have all employed ontologies [39, 64, 68].
Ontologies are very useful tools for codifying expert knowledge. They can use strict
or fuzzy semantics to identify dynamic context and conditions. In addition, ontologies
append easily to software systems using existing semantic reasoner software libraries such
as Pellet and Hermit [6, 10]. Additionally, the Web Ontology Language (OWL) provides
a standard, implementation agnostic format for specifying ontologies [9]. OWL ontologies
work with several software projects using diﬀerent semantic reasoner libraries.
2.3.5 Case-Based Reasoning
Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) is unique among the other AI problem solving
strategies [12]. Instead of employing knowledge learned from SMEs, CBR learns by
remembering previous solution cases and applying best match solutions to new cases.
Solutions that pass veriﬁcation become learned cases and add to the knowledge base for
future use. Failed solutions are remembered as well as incorrect solutions for future use.
The beneﬁt of CBR is that it emulates one of the way humans solve new situations. The
downside of CBR becomes evident when the system accepts an incorrect case as learned.
The incorrect case must be removed from the knowledge base for the system to function
properly.
In 2010, Gutierrez-Santos, et al. employed CBR in an ITS to create an exploratory
learning environment [40]. The environment allowed the students to create free-form
models and structures based on observed properties and relationships. A similar approach
would be useful in RCE in an assembly feature recognition module.
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2.3.6 Artiﬁcial Neural Networks
Artiﬁcial Neural Networks (ANNs) take AI a bit farther than other strategies by
attempting to recreate a portion of the actual biology of the intelligent being they are trying
emulate [55]. Typical applications of ANNs focus on achieving performance of highly
parallel processing similar to that of biological organisms. Networks of artiﬁcial neurons
characterize ANN designs. Each neuron produces an individual output based on the signals
received from the rest of the network [43]. Meta-heuristic algorithms can optimize the
application by training the network based on particular parameter values. The strength
of ANNs is their ability to solve complex, nonlinear classiﬁcation problems despite the
simplicity of individual neurons. Conversely, ANNs can be slow to train and can suﬀer
from over training.
2.3.7 Hidden Markov Model
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are statistical models that serve to analyze complex
random situations [43]. HMMs apply to time series or linear sequences to reveal important
unidentiﬁed states [33]. HMMs are eﬀective at identifying a condition based on partial
sequences of states [43]. Additionally, they can function as prediction algorithms due to
their ability to function with a partial sample of observations.
Cha, et al. proposed a HMM-based ITS [27]. In experiments against a decision tree
method of detecting learner style, the HMM approach led to an error rate half that of the
decision tree. Without proper training sequences, HMMs can identify and predict incorrect
situations. Finally, HMMs are computationally expensive compared to other systems.
2.3.8 Machine Learning
Machine learning is a signiﬁcant branch of AI that focuses on creating systems with
the ability to learn [15]. Learning can be implemented in many diﬀerent ways by employing
techniques including ANNs and HMMs. Additionally, machine learning can be supervised
or unsupervised. Supervised systems rely on a human supervisor to provide correct samples
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for analysis. Machine learning systems perform well at pattern matching and knowledge
extraction tasks. The primary disadvantage of using machine learning in an expert system
is accuracy. “Hand-crafted” ES knowledge bases achieve greater accuracy than ESs with
knowledge bases created by machine learning [21].
2.3.9 Fuzzy Logic
Not all problems ﬁt neatly into a particular state. Fuzzy logic relaxes matching criteria
to allow applications to be less precise in order to deal with uncertainty the way a human
might [26]. Systems that use fuzzy logic often attempt to work within a set of bounds
rather than an exact value. These systems are able to make decisions based on subjective
analysis. During development of fuzzy logic based systems, designer still must account for
all possible states. Fuzzy logic can detect if a set of measurements exists within a particular
state; it cannot detect new, unknown states.
Fuzzy logic has been used successfully in many diﬀerent AI systems. An
implementation of a traﬃc light control system demonstrated how fuzzy logic could
improve traﬃc ﬂow based on traﬃc density measurement. Lexicographical search
algorithms can use ontologies of synonyms to improve search results [54].
2.3.10 Summary
ES are useful because they allow SMEs to codify their knowledge in an information
system. The purpose of this section was to describe the advantages, disadvantages and
possible uses of the available ES technologies. Table 2.1 on page 26 provides a concise
summary of this section.
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Table 2.1: Summary of advantages and disadvantages for ES technologies
ES Technology Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s)
ITS Well-suited for basic instruction [61] Cannot detect frustration, boredom, or
loss of interest [22]
Rule-Based Self-documenting, independent, and
useful as programming models [65]
Rule structure ﬂat (non-hierarchical), all
rules must be evaluated for each check,
and tedious to program [65]
Knowledge-Based Increases availability of expert knowl-
edge and preserves for future use [20]
Perpetuates incorrect knowledge and
lacks common sense and intuition of
expert [20]
Ontologies Formalize domain knowledge and pro-
vide for knowledge reuse [71]. Stan-
dardized format, easy to use in software
systems [9]
Time consuming to generate and re-
quires collaboration between domain
experts and ontology developer [71]
Fuzzy Logic Allows for less precise condition match-
ing [26]
Designers must still account for all
possible condition states [26]
CBR Emulates human learning [12] Incorrectly learned information must be
purged from the set of cases [12]
ANN Capable of complex problem solving
and individual neurons are simple [43]
Slow to train and can be over-
trained [43]
HMM Eﬀective at identifying conditions based
on partial sequences of states and useful
as prediction algorithms [43]
Can identify incorrect states without
proper training and are computationally
expensive [27]
Machine Learning Well-suited for pattern matching and
knowledge extraction tasks [15]
Less accurate than “hand-crafted”
ESs [21]
2.4 Intermediate Representation and Binary Analysis Platform Introduction
2.4.1 Intermediate Representation of Assembly Language Programs
Excluding ﬂoating-point and other special purpose instructions, the Intel 64 and IA-
32 instruction set contain 254 unique general-purpose instructions [7]. Based on the
complexity of the instruction set and the presence of side-eﬀects, assembly-only analysis
becomes very diﬃcult [19]. Use of an IR will expose hidden operations and form an
abstraction for a robust instruction set architecture [53]. Several IR implementations
exist for disassembling and translating x86 programs. The following paraphrases the
requirements established by Koschke, et al. for an eﬀective IR [53].
R1 Programming language independent
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R2 Well-deﬁned semantics that exactly describe the constructs used in the modelled
programming languages
R3 IR traversals should be eﬃcient
R4 IR construction should be eﬃcient
R5 Length of IR should be linear to modeled source code
R6 IR should permit control and data ﬂow analysis eﬃciently
R7 IR should map to original source code
R8 IR should be able to describe a system composed of several programs
R9 Support various granularity levels based on use-case
R10 IR should retain user all comments and other information beyond the original
source code
R11 The IR should be saveable
R12 Adding code construct abstractions to the IR will not invalidate previous analysis
R13 IR should represent higher-level concepts
R14 IR should permit multiple views in multi-user environments
2.4.2 Binary Analysis Platform
The BAP is a framework of tools designed to create and manipulate IR of executable
programs [24]. BAP is an ongoing project at Carnegie Mellon University and has an active
support community.
2.4.2.1 Semantics
The BAP Intermediate Language (BIL) is the IR form used by the BAP framework
of utilities. BIL will decompose individual disassembled instructions into one or more
statements. There are just seven diﬀerent types of statement in BIL (var := exp, jmp, cjmp,
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halt, assert, label and special) and all have zero side-eﬀects. These statements reduce
massive instruction sets down to simple intuitive operations.
Several BIL expressions go into an individual BIL statement. BIL statements use the
following expressions to describe instructions. The load expression describes any activity
where reading memory and storing the contents in another location. The store expression
is the inverse of load as it describes when writing to memory. Additionally, expressions
can take the form of binary and unary operations. The remaining expressions (lab, cast,
let, unknown, and name) represent less frequent operations.
2.4.2.2 Utilities
2.4.2.2.1 toil The primary purpose of the toil utility is to convert exe-
cutable programs into BAP BIL. Programs analyzed with toil are ﬁrst “lifted” to the BIL.
Listing 2.7 demonstrates IA-32 instruction XOR EAX, EAX lifted to BIL. In this example,
R EAX:u32 represents the destination register. The remaining BIL statements expose the
side eﬀects of the XOR instruction. Additionally, the toil utility can lift dynamic traces
into BIL.
1 addr 0x40100e @asm "xor %eax ,%eax"
2 label pc_0x40100e
3 R_EAX:u32 = 0:u32
4 R_AF:bool = unknown "AF is undefined after xor":bool
5 R_ZF:bool = true
6 R_PF:bool = true
7 R_OF:bool = false
8 R_CF:bool = false
9 R_SF:bool = false
Listing 2.7: XOR EAX, EAX lifted to BAP BIL.
2.4.2.2.2 iltrans For user-prescribed transformations, the iltrans utility
can modify BIL code into several diﬀerent forms. This utility can create Abstract
Syntax Tree (AST), Control-Flow Graph (CFG) and many other outputs. Numerous
transformations are possible as a series of layers to reﬁne the BIL for a given analysis.
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Chopping is a transformation which reduces a program down to only the BIL statements
that aﬀect a sink node (destination) for a given source node. Other transforms perform the
removal of particular undesirable BIL such as dead (unreachable) or indirect (unsolvable)
code.
2.4.2.2.3 topredicate The topredicate command can transform a program
into a logical expression. This expression, known as the weakest precondition, deﬁnes the
minimal circumstance where the program is certain to ﬁnish in a predicted state. This
tool integrates with Satisﬁability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers in order to compute the
expressions created by topredicate.
2.4.2.2.4 ileval The ileval utility enables concrete evaluations to execute
BIL code natively instead of requiring recompilation into higher-level languages. Variables
added to the BIL program can determine how a program would execute. Flags, registers
and memory can also be set at any point in the BIL code to simulate speciﬁc conditions.
For example, if evaluating a suspected anti-debugging technique in a program, tainting the
memory address checked by the windows isDebuggerPresent() function could aﬀect the
execution of the program (see Listing 2.8). ileval can execute the tainted BIL and deter-
mine the result.
1 // initialize segment register base address
2 R_FS_BASE:u32 = 0x0:u32
3 mem:?u32 = mem:?u32 with [R_FS_BASE:u32 + 0x30:u32 , e_little ]:u32 =
0xdeadbeef:u32
4 // taint fs:[30h] + 2 = 1
5 mem:?u32 = mem:?u32 with [0 xdeadbeef:u32 + 2:u32 , e_little ]:u8 = 0x1
:u8
Listing 2.8: BIL code to taint the isDebuggerPresent() byte.
2.4.2.3 Limitations
BAP has several limitations. The main limitations outlined in the documentation
are (a) only x86 and x86-64 processors supported; (b) does not support analysis of
29
non-deterministic behaviors; (c) user-mode only; and (d) does not support ﬂoating-point
instructions. Additionally, BAP does not support instruction sequences that form cycles.
BAP will “unroll” a loop n times, but prior knowledge of n is required for correct
analysis. Furthermore, while BAP can analyze Windows PE binaries, it does not function
in Windows environments. BAP utilities can only be executed on Linux or Mac OSs.
2.5 Related Work
The following subsections describe research projects that have attempted to improve
performance of RCE activities [35, 46, 75] and projects that have addressed similar
problems in SE activities [48, 73].
2.5.1 Instruction Trace Pattern Matching
Instruction Trace Pattern Matching (ITPM) is an automated approach to detecting anti-
debugging [75]. It is designed to search dynamic instruction traces for instances of anti-
debugging patterns. First, to improve detection, a trace reﬁner scrubbed traces to remove
unnecessary or obfuscating instructions. Once scrubbed, heuristic rules attempt to match
the traces.
Xie, et al. conducted tests of the ITPM approach using 25 rules in four categories of
anti-debugging: API calls, OS ﬂags, magic strings and others [75]. Experiments processed
768 malware samples with a total detection rate of nearly 39%.
ITPM has two key characteristics that should be investigated: static vs. dynamic
analysis and heuristic dependence. First, ITPM is a dynamic tool that relies on complete
instruction traces. This in turn increases the probability of infection and requires the
protection of a VM or emulator. As a result, ITPM must be conscious of execution safety.
Static tools do not have this issue. Second, large instruction sets can subvert instruction-
level analysis. Instruction matching rules must capture all possible combinations of
instructions for a technique. If ITPM used IR, it could eliminate much of the confusion
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caused by large instruction sets. This would allow for more concise rules that covered
many diﬀerent implementations.
2.5.2 Divergence Detector
Anti-VM techniques share many of the characteristics and motivations as anti-
debugging techniques. Divergence Detector is a system for detecting such anti-VM
techniques in malicious programs [46]. This method followed the principle that at any
time during execution, a program can only execute one anti-VM check.
Divergence Detector is a system built upon three common malware analysis VMs:
QEMU, Xen and Bochs. Each VM is loaded with the same guest OS and sample program.
When ready, the system executes the malware sample, outputs an instruction trace and
rolls back to a pre-test state. Divergence Detector compared traces and noted execution
diﬀerences as divergences. Wherever the execution paths diﬀer, VM checks are present.
To eliminate uncertain false-positives, the process repeats several times to remove non-
deterministic divergences from analysis.
When tested, Divergence Detector was capable of detecting instances of anti-VM
techniques in malware samples. Hsu, et al. describe several trials where a divergence
occurs in one of the VM environment but not the others [46]. Analysis of uncertainty
reduction in the system revealed as the number of experiment rounds increased, the
number of false detections decreased. In the test program, false divergences followed the
probabilistic model very closely and disappeared after seven rounds.
2.5.3 Static and Dynamic Analysis
Eisenbarth, et al. describe a system for automating portions of RCE tasks by static
and dynamic analysis [35]. Their approach ﬁrst employs mathematical concept analysis
to analyze binary relationships and derive a framework of all concepts used in a particular
context called a concept lattice. This concept lattice then targets the dynamic analysis to
identify sub-programs used for a set of features. Finally, static analysis separates essential
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and non-essential sub-programs to focus human reverse engineering activities. In their
experiments analyzing two web browsers, the researchers were able to reduce the search
space of subprograms requiring further investigation by 98%.
This approach depends on the expertise of a human reverse engineer. If the reverse
engineer lacks the necessary skills, the analysis will stall. Using an ES would enhance this
process by introducing expert knowledge into the automated analysis.
2.5.4 Plug-ins for Popular Debuggers
There are several popular debuggers, in use today, that allow the addition of plug-ins
to extend their functionality [45]. Debuggers such as OllyDbg, Immunity, IDA Pro and
WinDbg all have anti-debugging plug-ins available[1, 2, 11]. These plug-ins are created
by individuals and small teams in the debugger user community. They rely on heuristic
analysis to detect API calls used by anti-debugging techniques. Some plug-ins are in active
development, others have terminated. All plug-ins for these debugger oﬀer little or no
documentation.
2.5.5 The Varlet Analyst
Database (DB) reverse engineering has issues very similar to those of RCE. DB
schemas themselves often do not reveal the purpose or use cases for the DB. Schemas,
code and documentation must be compiled and analyzed to reveal a design speciﬁcation
for a re-engineered system [48]. The Varlet Analysis is a knowledge-based, semi-automatic
approach to improve performance of DB reverse engineering activities.
The Varlet Analysis attempted to combine automatic RE analysis with customized
domain knowledge to produce additional hypotheses about the system. Generic Fuzzy
Reasoning Nets (GFRN) provided an abstract graphical framework for capturing speciﬁc
domain knowledge. The GFRN and automated results were provided to an inference
engine which generates additional hypotheses for addition into a working logical schema.
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Conﬁrmed hypotheses were used to infer a logical schema for the ﬁnal translated
conceptual design.
In addition to its focus on DB reverse engineering, the Varlet Analysis depends on
application source code, schemas and domain experts to complete a conceptual design.
Typical RCE activities do not beneﬁt from these resources. However, an iterative automated
analysis to human hypothesis veriﬁcation loop could have use in analyzing code samples
that resist other forms of analysis.
2.5.6 RODS and HASTI: Software Engineering Cognitive Support
Software Engineering (SE) is another area of computer science where tasks are
diﬃcult to automate and human cognition is critical. The purpose of the RODS framework
is to reduce the complexity of code samples to improve the developer’s cognition [73]. The
HASTI framework works to augment the developer’s cognition of SE tasks by modeling
the elements and interactions aﬀecting cognition. Together RODS and HASTI can improve
developer performance by aiding cognition.
The RODS framework was designed as an application of the following principles:
“task reduction”, “algorithmic optimization”, “distribution”, and “specialization”. Task
reduction removes redundant tasks and replaces complicated tasks with simpler versions
of the same task. Algorithmic optimization can improve eﬃciency and understandability
by reducing the computational complexity of algorithms. Distribution acts to oﬄoad
knowledge and mental states from the developer to a computer by artifact management and
computational assistance. Finally, specialization aids the developer by oﬀering task speciﬁc
tools that more general tools lack. An example of specialization in computer science is
using a language speciﬁc integrated development environment instead of a generic text
editor for software development.
HASTI describes the models and methods used for analysis: “hardware models”,
“agent models”, “specialization hierarchy, “task taxonomy”, and “interaction abstraction
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layer”. The hardware model maintains speciﬁc facts related to the system hardware such
as processing and memory limitations. The agent model relates individual “goal-focused
tasks” to speciﬁc application components and code. The specialization hierarchy identiﬁes
relative task complexity by associating speciﬁc solution processes to development tasks
based on how well the solution applies to the activity. A task taxonomy is used break down
large complicated tasks into smaller tasks of known complexity. Finally, an interaction
abstraction layer helps the developer by simplifying the interface between the software and
hardware components.
SE and RCE each have many activities that aﬀect human cognition. A framework
resembling RODS and HASTI could provide cognitive assistance to the human preforming
RCE activities. Particularly, RODS-like functionality could work to de-obfuscate
disassembled code or associate unknown segments of code to known samples. A
framework resembling HASTI could provide assistance by tracking and maintaining
system and application details, freeing the human reverse engineer to focus on other
details.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter deﬁnes the methodology for implementation and testing the Rule Engine
Detection by Intermediate Representation (REDIR) system for automating the static
detection of obfuscated anti-debugging techniques in software samples. The goals and
hypothesis behind this research are given in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes the design of
the REDIR system. Section 3.4 provides the REDIR system architecture, its hardware and
software speciﬁcations, and the development environment used. The test corpus employed
for this research is speciﬁed in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6, the details of each test case are
provided. Lastly, the results of pilot experimentation are oﬀered in Section 3.7.
3.2 Goals and Hypothesis
The goal of this research is to demonstrate that (a) an Intermediate Representation (IR)
based system can detect common analysis evasion techniques in program samples; (b) a
rule-based Expert System (ES) can do the high-level matching required to reduce the search
space; and (c) this method is resistant to common obfuscation techniques. To achieve
this goal, the Data/Frame sensemaking theory guides the process of developing minimal
starting information into complete anti-debugging detections.
The following hypothesis drives this research. Most anti-debugging techniques begin
at some calculated or retrieved value α and end at a control-ﬂow decision β. In program P,
a rule R that searches for α and β can lead to the creation of a sub-program C = {α...β} for
instance T (R, α, β) of anti-debugging technique R. If C is valid in P, then C instrumented
with additional data can replicate non-debugging (Cnd) and debugging conditions (Cd).
Evaluation of Cnd and Cd creates boolean values End and Ed respectively. If comparison of
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End and Ed result in an inequality, then the data that replicated the debugging conditions
caused the divergence. The divergence conﬁrms the detection of T (R, α, β) in P.
Figure 3.1 depicts the REDIR concept through the Data/Frame sensemaking process.
Frames are “constructed” with the detection of α and β. First, “questioning” creates the
sub-program C that provides for “elaboration” to create instrumented sub-programs Cnd
and Cd are created. Then, “questioning” resumes by evaluating Cnd and Cd to create End
and Ed. Finally, “questioning” End and Ed to determine an inequality conﬁrms the detection
of the anti-debugging technique.
Figure 3.1: REDIR concept through the Data/Frame sensemaking process.
3.3 Design
3.3.1 Rule Engine Detection by Intermediate Representation
The REDIR system is a debugger plug-in written in the Java language. It was designed
to process 32-bit Windows executables and identify instances of anti-debugging. The
integration with the debugger disassembly view provides users visual identiﬁcation of the
anti-debugging instance.
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3.3.2 Expert System Selection - Rule Engine
Numerous ES technologies are presented in this research. Each was evaluated for
use in a Reverse Code Engineering (RCE) tool. The selection of a rule-based system was
made based on its intended purpose, comparability with the other system components and
usability. Readers should consider the selection of a rule-based system as a best-ﬁt decision,
not an endorsement or recommendation. This research did not perform in-depth testing of
all possible ES technologies. Future work in the conclusion of this document will describe
related research considered early in the process for implementation using the other ES
technologies.
The rule engine selected for REDIR was JBoss Drools [5]. Drools was selected
because it is a Java-based rule engine which supports object-oriented rule processing with
an intuitive syntax.
Rules written for REDIR are high-level patterns of IR. These patterns provide a min-
imal representation of the technique to build the detection on. Based on the Data/Frame
sensemaking model, each rule activation by the rule-engine (referred to as “frame” for the
remainder of this document) serves as the starting point for more in-depth analysis. First,
Listing 3.1 depicts the rule used to detect instances of the PEB!IsDebugger technique. This
implementation is only concerned with accessing the FS segment register where the byte
resides and any conditional jump. Then, Listing 3.2 shows the rule for detecting RDTSC-
based timing techniques. This rule checks for two unique rdtsc calls, following the same
register from each (either EAX or EDX). Finally, Listing 3.3 provides the rule for testing the
MOV SS technique. Similar to the PEB!IsDebugger rule, this rule only looks for two state-
ments; data stored to the Stack Segment (SS) register and a conditional jump.
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1 rule "PEB_isDebuggerFlag_1"
2 when
3 $source : Statement(
4 il matches ".* R_FS_BASE:u32.*")
5 $sink : Statement(
6 il matches ".*cjmp.*")
7 then
8 // Activation returns to main program
9 end
Listing 3.1: Drools rule for the PEB!IsDebugger anti-debugging technique.
1 rule "rdtsc_timing_1"
2 no-loop true
3 when
4 //Step 1 - Obtain base address of FS register
5 $source : Statement(
6 $il_1 : il ,
7 $addrAsInt_1 : addrAsInt ,
8 asm matches ".* rdtsc .*")
9 $2 : Statement(
10 $addrAsInt_2 : addrAsInt ,
11 $il_2 : il ,
12 asm matches ".* rdtsc .*")
13 // Verify $1 and $2 use same registers.
14 eval ($il_1 == $il_2)
15 // Verify addresses are different. Prevents duplicate returns.
16 eval ($addrAsInt_1 != $addrAsInt_2)
17 // Verify 1st and 2nd timing checks are different statements
18 eval ($source != $2)
19 $sink : Statement(
20 il matches ".*cjmp.*")
21 then
22 // Activation returns to main program
23 end
Listing 3.2: Drools rule for the RDTSC Timing anti-debugging technique.
1 rule "Mov_SS_1"
2 no-loop true
3 when
4 $source : Statement(
5 il matches ".*R_SS:u16 =.*")
6 $sink : Statement(
7 il matches ".*cjmp.*")
8 then
9 // Activation returns to main program
10 end
Listing 3.3: Drools rule for the MOV SS anti-debugging technique.
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3.3.3 Intermediate Representation
The hidden nature of anti-debugging techniques drove the decision to use an IR
technology. IR tools can illuminate the hidden aspects of anti-debugging with extremely
beneﬁcial capabilities. However, like all tools, IR has its limitations. To accept the
added functionality, this research also had to accept the limitations of the selected IR
implementation.
The IR technology selected for this project was Binary Analysis Platform (BAP) 0.7
for the following reasons [24]. First, BAP is in active development and has an active user
group for support. Next, BAP has an abstracted Intermediate Language (IL) that oﬀers
easily analyzable instruction semantics. Finally, BAP oﬀers concrete execution of IL. This
capability oﬀered to not only detect instances of anti-debugging, but also determine the
jump direction caused by the detection of the debugger.
To facilitate the use of BAP for evaluating programs, each frame from the rule engine
contains the source and sink nodes that mark the beginning and end for a sub-program in
BIL known as a chop. An instrumentation process adds additional variables and tainted
values to the chopped program for evaluation. Each anti-debugging technique requires a
diﬀerent unique instrumentation. Listing 3.4 demonstrates an example of a minimum in-
strumentation and Algorithm 1 depicts a generic instrumentation process.
1 goal:bool = true // InitGoalBooleanString
2 // InitMemString ...
3 // Chop C ...
4 // BB_ERROR replaced with appropriate targets
5 cjmp ˜R_ZF:bool , "JMP", "NOJMP"
6
7 label NOJMP // NOJMPLabelString
8 goal := false // UpdateGoalBooleanString
9 label JMP // JMPLabelString
10 halt goal
Listing 3.4: Example of a minimum instrumentation (chopped code omitted).
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Algorithm 1 Generic Instrumentation Algorithm
1: procedure instrument(Chop C, Boolean tainted)
2: result.append(InitGoalBooleanS tring)
3: result.append(InitMemS tring)
4: result.append(C)
5:  Replace error jump targets with appropriate targets
6: result.replaceFirst(“BB ERROR′′, “JMP′′)
7: result.replaceLast(“BB ERROR′′, “NOJMP′′)
8: result.append(NOJMPLabelS tring)
9: result.append(UpdateGoalBooleanS tring)
10: result.append(JMPLabelS tring)
11: if tainted == true then
12: result.replace(InitMemS tring, TaintedMemS tring)
13: end if
14: return result
15: end procedure
3.3.4 Algorithm
Following initialization by the rule-engine, each frame T (R, α, β) develops in the
Data/Frame sensemaking model by questioning, elaborating and evaluating the frame.
The REDIR algorithm questions by attempting to add chop C = {α...β} to the frame with
the BAP iltrans utility (see Algorithm 2). Next, if chopped successfully, instrumentation
elaborates C to form Cnd and Cd versions of the sub-program for evaluation. The ﬁnal
step uses the BAP ileval command (beginning on line 13) to evaluate Cnd and Cd. If the
evaluation results, End and Ed respectively, are not the same, this shows the simulated
debugging condition data aﬀected the outcome of the program and conﬁrms T (R, α, β) as
an anti-debugging instance.
3.3.5 Debugger Interface
The DigR debugger hosts the REDIR plug-in and provides access to the executable
for analysis as well as the architecture for information display [4]. When active, REDIR
presents a table of frames. For each frame, REDIR lists important information such as the
source and sink nodes, chop validity, detection, and jump direction. Additionally, when
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Algorithm 2 REDIR Algorithm
1: procedure go(Program P)
2: bil← BAP.toil(P)
3: ast ← BAP.iltrans(bil)
4: ruleEngine.load(ast)
5: F ← ruleEngine. f ireAllRules()
6: for f ∈ F do
7: Chop C ← BAP.iltrans(ast, f .α, f .β)
8: if valid(C) then
9: Cd ← instrument(C, True, f .technique)
10: Cnd ← instrument(C, False, f .technique)
11: Ed ← BAP.ileval(Cd)
12: End ← BAP.ileval(Cnd)
13: if Ed <> End then
14: f .detected ← true
15: else
16: f .detected ← f alse
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: return F
21: end procedure
selected in REDIR, the disassembly view will update to highlight the instructions used by
the technique.
3.3.6 Design Considerations
Based on previously described limitations of the BAP framework (Section 2.4.2.3),
REDIR has two signiﬁcant restrictions. Future releases of the BAP framework may
mitigate these limitations.
3.3.6.1 Cycles
Anti-debugging techniques that form cycles such as loops are not analyzable in the
BAP Framework. Subsequently, REDIR cannot detect these techniques.
3.3.6.2 Operating System Compatibility
BAP is not compatible with the Windows Operating System (OS). BAP operates
only in Linux and Mac environments. DigR is a Windows debugger. To facilitate using
BAP with DigR a bridge was required. As REDIR was already Java-based, a simple Java-
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based proxy interacted with REDIR via Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI). This proxy
received input from REDIR, executed the desired BAP program and returned the result to
REDIR.
3.4 Implementation
REDIR and the BAP proxy executed within connected Virtual Machines (VMs). As
depicted in Figure 3.2, a single Windows 8 computer with VMWare Workstation 9.0 hosted
each of the VMs. For this system, DigR executed inside a Windows 7 VM and the BAP
Framework and proxy inside an Ubuntu Server 12.04 VM. REDIR itself is a plug-in for the
DigR debugger. As a plug-in, REDIR had access to show highlight anti-debug techniques
in the DigR Disassembly View.
Figure 3.2: REDIR system conﬁguration.
3.4.1 Hardware and Software Speciﬁcations
• Host: Lenovo Y500 laptop computer
42
– OS: Windows 8
– CPU: Intel Core i7-3630QM
– Random Access Memory (RAM): 16 Gigabyte (GB)
– Key Software: VMWare Workstation 9.0
• DigR Host and Development VM
– OS: Windows 7
– CPU setting: 2 processors, 2 cores per processor
– RAM setting: 4 GB
– Hard disk setting: 60 GB
– Key Software: DigR Debugger, Eclipse - Kepler Release
• BAP Host VM
– OS: Ubuntu Server 12.04
– CPU setting: 1 processor, 1 core per processor
– RAM setting: 1 GB
– Hard disk setting: 20 GB
– Key Software: BAP Framework
3.4.2 Development Environment
REDIR and the BAP Proxy were developed using Eclipse: Kepler Release. Plug-in
development occurred within the Windows 7 VM described in the previous section. Proxy
development took place on an Ubuntu 12.04 VM with an identical BAP conﬁguration.
3.5 Testing Methodology
Unfortunately, it is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd anti-debugging technique samples that will
disassemble correctly, are unencrypted, and guaranteed to exhibit the desired behavior.
For these reasons, synthetic program samples modeled real-world malware anti-debugging
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implementations. All samples used the Intel Architecture, 32-bit (IA-32) Microsoft Macro
Assembler (MASM) assembly syntax and compiled with the MASM assembler. Each
simple program attempts debugger detection and prints either “Debugger found” or “No
debugger found” based on the detection result. For each anti-debug technique, one of
each of the obfuscations disguised the technique. Due to the similarities among anti-
debugging techniques, not all known anti-debugging techniques were required for testing.
Many techniques employ the same overall strategy; as a result, their associated clues and
instrumentations would only be slightly diﬀerent and no less solvable. For testing REDIR,
the techniques are broken down into representative categories as follows:
1. OS Flags - Represented by theWindows PEB!IsDebugger byte. See Section 2.2.3.3.1.
2. Timing - Represented by the RDTSC Timing technique. See Section 2.2.3.3.2.
3. Interrupt Handling - Represented by the MOV SS technique. See Section 2.2.3.3.3.
For each anti-debug technique, each of the following obfuscations will be applied to
form a matrix of anti-debug technique/obfuscation samples.
1. No Obfuscation
2. Dead Code Insertion
3. Register Reassignment
4. Code Transposition
5. Instruction Substitution
6. Conditional Code Obfuscation
Obfuscation numbers two through ﬁve are forms of layout obfuscation (see Section 2.2.3.4.1).
Obfuscation six is a form of conditional code obfuscation (see Section 2.2.3.4.2).
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3.6 Experiment Design
To adequately test the REDIR system, each of the program samples must be analyzed
in the debugger. For each sample, the debugger will load the executable and launch the
REDIR process. There are four measures to describe the performance of the system.
1. Source/Sink Identiﬁcation - Did REDIR ﬁnd the source and sink for the implemented
anti-debug technique? This evaluation infers the correct operation of the frame
construction mechanism. Without the correct source and sink nodes, REDIR will
not ﬁnd the implemented anti-debug technique.
2. Chop Identiﬁcation - Did REDIR highlight the correct instructions in the disassem-
bly? This analysis is important because an incorrect chop could lead to an incorrect
positive or negative detection result.
3. Anti-debug Technique Identiﬁcation - Did REDIR ﬁnd the implemented anti-debug
technique? This evaluation is most important as it demonstrates the feasibility of the
system.
4. Jump Direction - Did REDIR predict the correct jump direction based on a
simulated anti-debug condition? During preliminary development incorrect or non-
identiﬁcation of the jump direction strongly implied a critical error that could
invalidate one or more of the previous evaluations. Correct identiﬁcation during this
evaluation reinforces the previous evaluation results.
Due to the limitations imposed by the system design, execution time for the REDIR
plug-in is not an informative metric.
The following list describes six test cases that were used detail the evaluation of
REDIR. These cases were selected because together they fully test the REDIR system
under all the available anti-debug techniques and obfuscations. Additionally, for each
technique, they demonstrate how a single strategy can detect multiple implementations.
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The remaining twelve test cases were tested following the same methodology. Their results
are summarized in Chapter 4.
3.6.1 Test Case #1: PEB!IsDebugger/No Obfuscation
The purpose of this ﬁrst test case is to demonstrate REDIR with a non-obfuscated
anti-debug technique. The code sample for this test case is the same as the sample
shown in Listing 2.2. Evaluation of REDIR’s analysis should reveal detection of the
PEB!IsDebugger technique comprised of four lines of code beginning with the FS register
access and ending with a conditional jump. Additionally, based on the use of the test
eax,eax and jne DebuggerFound instructions, analysis should conclude that using a
debugger will cause taking the conditional jump instead of falling through to the next
instruction.
3.6.2 Test Case #2: RDTSC Timing/Dead Code Insertion
The second test case demonstrated that REDIR could ignore meaningless code in-
serted between important instructions. As shown in Listing 3.5, this program has unnec-
essary nop instructions added. REDIR should reveal detect the RDTSC Timing technique
in eight lines of code beginning with the ﬁrst rdtsc instruction and ending with the condi-
tional jump. The nop instructions should be ignored. The ﬁnal two instructions, cmp eax,
ecx and ja DebuggerFound, would cause this program to jump is suﬃciently delayed.
REDIR should detect a debugger will cause the program to choose taking the conditional
jump.
46
1 rdtsc
2 nop
3 xor ecx , ecx
4 nop
5 add ecx , eax
6 nop
7 rdtsc
8 nop
9 sub eax , ecx
10 mov ecx , 0FFFh
11 nop
12 cmp eax , ecx
13 ja DebuggerFound
Listing 3.5: IA-32 implementation example of RDTSC Timing detection technique
with dead code obfuscation applied.
3.6.3 Test Case #3: MOV SS/Register Reassignment
Test case three demonstrates how BAP enables REDIR to follow important data de-
spite moving it between registers. Listing 3.6 shows how this program attempts to conceal
testing the trap ﬂag. Here, the program grabs the bit from the stack and places it in the
bx register. Next the value is moved to the cx register before eventually being tested on
line six. REDIR should detect exactly six lines of code for this technique starting with the
pop ss instruction and ending with the conditional jump. The initial push ss instruction
is not part of the technique, it only preserves the original value of the SS register. If the trap
ﬂag is set, the last two instructions, test cx, 1 and jne DebuggerFound, would cause
this program to jump. REDIR should detect a debugger will cause the program to choose
taking the conditional jump.
1 push ss
2 pop ss
3 pushfd
4 mov bx, word ptr [esp+1]
5 mov cx, bx ; reassign register
6 test cx , 1
7 jne DebuggerFound
Listing 3.6: IA-32 implementation example of the MOV SS detection technique with
register reassignment obfuscation applied.
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3.6.4 Test Case #4: PEB!IsDebugger/Code Transposition
As depicted in Listing 2.5, the purpose of this test case is to demonstrate REDIR’s
performance with unordered code. REDIR should detect the PEB!IsDebugger technique
in seven lines in the order (12, 13, 6, 7, 3, 4, 9) beginning with the FS register access and
ending with a conditional jump. Just like test #1, this test case employs the test eax,eax
and jne DebuggerFound instructions. As a result, REDIR should show that debugging
would cause following the conditional jump.
3.6.5 Test Case #5: RDTSC Timing/Instruction Substitution
The purpose of test case #5 is to show that REDIR can detect a technique when alter-
native instructions are used. Based on Listing 2.3, this example shows the replacement of
several instructions while maintaining the original functionality (see Listing 3.7). REDIR
should detect the RDTSC Timing in exactly nine lines of code starting with the ﬁrst rdtsc
instruction and ending with the conditional jump. The push/pop combination replaces the
original add instruction and a sub instruction replaces the cmp instruction to invert the con-
ditional jump evaluation. The conditional jump has also been replaced. The jnl instruction
replaces the ja instruction. The ﬁrst jumps if the tested value is above the threshold. The
second jumps if the tested value is not less than the threshold. Finally, the jump target
has been replaced. Instead of jumping when being debugged, this sample will jump if not
debugged. REDIR should detect the conditional jump will not be taken if being debugged.
1 rdtsc
2 xor ecx , ecx
3 push eax
4 rdtsc
5 pop ecx
6 sub eax , ecx
7 mov ecx , 0FFFh
8 sub ecx , eax
9 jnl NoDebuggerFound
Listing 3.7: IA-32 implementation example of RDTSC Timing detection technique
with instruction substitution obfuscation applied.
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3.6.6 Test Case #6: MOV SS/Opaque Predicate
The purpose of the ﬁnal test case is to show that REDIR can employ concrete eval-
uation to decipher a complex obfuscation and ﬁnd an anti-debug technique. The imple-
mentation of the MOV SS technique shown in Listing 3.8 begins on line 3 at the pop ss
instruction and terminates at line 32 with the jne instruction. Since all the selected instruc-
tions between carry data from beginning to end, 30 lines of code represent the entire MOV
SS technique. Similar to the ﬁrst four test cases, this test case should take the conditional
jump if detecting a debugger.
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1 xor ebx , ebx
2 push ss
3 pop ss
4 pushfd ; push EFLAGS
5 xor eax , eax
6 add ax , x
7 add ax , y
8 imul ax , ax
9 push ax ; push (x+y)ˆ2
10 xor eax , eax
11 mov ax , x
12 imul ax , ax
13 push ax ; push xˆ2
14 xor eax , eax
15 mov ax , y
16 imul ax , ax
17 push ax ; push yˆ2
18 xor eax , eax
19 xor ebx , ebx
20 mov ax , x
21 mov bx , y
22 imul ax , bx
23 imul ax , 2 ; ax = 2xy
24 pop bx ; bx = yˆ2
25 add ax , bx ; ax = 2xy + yˆ2
26 pop bx ; bx = xˆ2
27 add ax , bx ; ax = xˆ2 + 2xy + yˆ2
28 pop bx ; bx = (x+y)ˆ2
29 cmp ax , bx ; always evaluates true: ax == bx
30 jne fake ; never jumps
31 test word ptr [esp+1], 1 ; test trap flag
32 jne DebuggerFound
Listing 3.8: IA-32 implementation example of the MOV SS detection technique with
opaque predicate obfuscation applied.
3.7 Pilot Experiment
Initial experimentation with the BAP framework and the Drools rule engine led to the
creation of the REDIR system. However, the ﬁrst iteration design of the REDIR system
had several ﬂaws which contributed to the design decisions made for the ﬁnal version.
The issues with found during pilot experimentation are due to rule engine processing of
anti-debug techniques, BAP deployment and TF support.
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3.7.1 Rule Engine Processing
The pilot design depended heavily on the rule engine for anti-debug detections. This
design utilized complete anti-debug technique heuristic patterns in the IR. The drawback
of this approach was that rules were fragile and not provable. It was easy to write test
programs which could evade detection. Additionally, this design required the rule engine
have the ability to follow the ﬂow of execution. Additional processing steps helped
establish dependence and track the ﬂow of execution since instructions without common
data were not likely anti-debug implementations.
To improve the design, two improvements were implemented. First, the rule engine’s
role was modiﬁed. Instead of looking for complete techniques, the rules were relaxed to
ﬁnd sections where a technique could be present. The new rules only look for the few IR
statements that must occur in the anti-debugging technique sought. Other common, but not
required, IR statements are ignored by the rules. Chops could be created based on the rule
engine detections that contained pertinent IR. The second improvement was the inclusion
of concrete evaluation. This improvement allows rule engine detections evaluations in the
IR to prove the technique detection.
Because of the design changes, several improvements were realized. The improved
REDIR design was much faster. Execution times improved from over one minute down
to less than two seconds. This improvement was largely due to reduced rule engine
processing. Additionally, the new design was more robust. Technique implementations
that bypassed detection before became detectable. Instrumented chops derived from the
simple rule detections were easier to evaluate than entire programs with the rule engine’s
complex heuristic rules.
3.7.2 Binary Analysis Platform Deployment
As stated in Section 3.3.6.2, the BAP framework is only compatible with Linux and
Mac environments. Meanwhile, the DigR debugger is a Windows only tool. Several
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deployment attempts tried to place both tools on the same platform. However, no method
was found to install both tools on the same computer. Two attempts were made to
use a Linux emulator for BAP deployment. First, BAP deployment was attempted in
Cygwin [3]. Unfortunately, unidentiﬁed secondary dependencies were not available in
the Cygwin environment; BAP installation could not be completed. Installation attempts
with Minimalist GNU for Windows (MinGW) faced the same dilemma [8]. All attempts
to install BAP in Windows were unsuccessful. Consultation with the BAP User Group
revealed no concerted eﬀort to deploy BAP in a Windows environment.
At the time of this experimentation, an Ubuntu 12.04 VM hosted the BAP framework
and a Windows 7 VM hosted DigR. The next available strategy, the client-server model
described in Section 3.4, was quickly implemented and tested. This design provided the
desired performance and usability without the need for additional conﬁguration changes.
This design proved to be satisfactory and remains part of the REDIR system.
3.7.3 Trap Flag Support
BAP 0.7 does not support the TF by default. To support the MOV SS technique
the capability to track the TF was required. The BAP source code was modiﬁed for this
research to allow analysis involving the TF. With the assistance of the BAP Users Group, I
was able to add the feature and implement the MOV SS anti-debug technique detection.
3.8 Methodology Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the REDIR system and the methodology
behind its implementation. First, its design, development and implementation details were
given. Next, the test methodology and its rationale was oﬀered. Then, the experiment
design with speciﬁc test case descriptions was provided. Finally, pilot experimentation
results contributing to the design decisions described in this chapter. The next chapter
describes how testing was conducted and the results of that testing.
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IV. Experiment Results
4.1 Introduction
This chapter details the test results and test analysis for the Rule Engine Detection by
Intermediate Representation (REDIR) system. First, overall test evaluation and analysis
are oﬀered in Section 4.2. Next, in Section 4.3, detailed test reports describe each of the six
test case results. Finally, Section 4.4 provides analysis of the design and implementation
of the REDIR system.
4.2 Evaluation and Analysis
The purpose of testing the REDIR plug-in was to determine if the tool was capable of
detecting anti-debugging techniques in obfuscated code. Testing followed by initializing
the REDIR plug-in for each test program and manually analyzing each result (see
Section 3.5). Screen captures recorded the analysis results displayed in the DigR window
for each attempt. Success was evaluated by (a) correct identiﬁcation of instruction lines
used by the technique; and (b) correct determination of jump direction.
The REDIR plug-in analyzed each of the 18 anti-debugging/obfuscation sample
programs. In each case, the tool created multiple frames during the analysis. Many of the
generated frames were invalid and correctly discarded. Most programs correctly yielded
only one valid frame. In all test cases, the REDIR correctly identiﬁed the technique and
highlighted the set of instructions that aﬀected the outcome of the program. REDIR was
100% eﬀective for those 18 test cases. REDIR did not highlight irrelevant instructions
with no bearing on the outcome. Table 4.1 summarizes the entire test corpus and detection
results.
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Table 4.1: Test results summary
Anti-debugging
Obfuscation
None Dead CodeInsertion
Register
Reassignment
PEB!IsDebugger Detected
Section 4.3.1
Detected Detected
RDTSC Timing Detected Detected
Section 4.3.2
Detected
MOV SS Detected Detected Detected
Section 4.3.3
Anti-debugging
Obfuscation Code
Transposition
Instruction
Substitution
Opaque
Predicate
PEB!IsDebugger Detected
Section 4.3.4
Detected Detected
RDTSC Timing Detected Detected
Section 4.3.5
Detected
MOV SS Detected Detected Detected
Section 4.3.6
4.3 Detailed Test Case Analysis
The following subsections detail the results of six test cases. These test cases are
representative of the larger test corpus and eliminate redundant explanations. The test
results obtained from the remaining twelve test cases closely follow those presented below.
4.3.1 Test Case #1: PEB!IsDebugger/No Obfuscation
4.3.1.1 Test Summary
This test of the PEB!IsDebugger technique paired with no obfuscation demonstrated
REDIR operation in the simplest case. The frame at index ﬁve in Figure 4.1 correctly
identiﬁed the implemented technique. Figure 4.2 shows just the four original lines of code
selected in the disassembly view. Aside from minor disassembly diﬀerences, this test case
matches the original sample perfectly (see Figure 2.2).
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4.3.1.2 Source/Sink Identiﬁcation
The rule for this technique searches for a pair of instructions. The ﬁrst a FS access and
the second a conditional jump. The lines 0x401000 and 0x40100c created by rule engine
for the frame at index ﬁve correctly match to the FS access and a conditional jump. The
remaining frames matched other instruction pairs and persisted temporarily to make a chop
attempt.
4.3.1.3 Chop Identiﬁcation
A chop for each of the frames captured by the rule engine was attempted. Beginning
with the source and sink nodes 0x401000 and 0x40100c, iltrans correctly created a chop
for the frame at index ﬁve. As predicted, only the instructions that carry data from the
source to the sink display in the disassembly view.
4.3.1.4 Anti-debugging Technique Identiﬁcation
In this sample, exactly one implementation of the PEB!IsDebugger technique was
implemented. The frame at index ﬁve correctly asserts the presence of the technique.
4.3.1.5 Jump Direction
Based on the result of the instrumented evaluation simulating the debugging condition,
REDIR correctly identiﬁed that the presence of a debugger would cause this program to
jump (to line 0x40101a) instead of fall through to the next instruction (at line 0x40100e).
Figure 4.1: Created frames during analysis of PEB!IsDebugger technique without
obfuscation.
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Figure 4.2: Highlighted DigR disassembly view of PEB!IsDebugger technique without
obfuscation.
4.3.2 Test Case #2: RDTSC Timing/Dead Code Insertion
This test of the rdtcs timing technique paired with dead code insertion demonstrated
REDIR operation in the simplest case of obfuscation. The frame at index ﬁve in Figure 4.3
correctly identiﬁed the implemented technique. Figure 4.4 shows the eight original lines
of code selected in the disassembly view. Between these lines, several nop instructions are
skipped because they have no eﬀect in this program. As in the previous case, this test case
perfectly matches the original sample (see Figure 2.3).
Figure 4.3: Created frames during analysis of the RDTSC Timing technique obfuscated by
dead code insertion.
4.3.2.1 Source/Sink Identiﬁcation
The rule for this technique searches for a pair of rdtsc instructions and a conditional
jump. The lines 0x401000 and 0x401016 created by the frame at index ﬁve are correctly
matched by the rule engine for the frame at index ﬁve correctly match to the ﬁrst rdtsc
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Figure 4.4: Highlighted DigR disassembly view of the RDTSC Timing technique
obfuscated by dead code insertion.
instruction and a conditional jump. The remaining frames matched other instruction sets
and continue on to the chop attempt.
4.3.2.2 Chop Identiﬁcation
Again, the REDIR attempted a chop for each of the frames captured by the rule engine.
Beginning with the source and sink nodes 0x401000 and 0x401016, the frame at index ﬁve
provided iltrans the correct source and sink nodes for a successful chop. By eliminating the
nop instructions, REDIR only selected the participating instructions from the source to the
sink. Frames zero through four were discarded because they did not lead to a valid chop.
4.3.2.3 Anti-debugging Technique Identiﬁcation
This code sample contained exactly one implementation of the RDTSC Timing
technique. Index ﬁve represents the frame that correctly identiﬁes the instance of the
technique.
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4.3.2.4 Jump Direction
With a simulated delay in processing, the instrumented evaluation correctly identiﬁed
that the presence of a debugger would cause this program to jump (to line 0x401024)
instead of fall through to the next instruction (at line 0x401018).
4.3.3 Test Case #3: MOV SS/Register Reassignment
4.3.3.1 Test Summary
This test of the MOV SS technique paired with register reassignment demonstrated
REDIR operation in a slightly more obfuscated condition. Again, the frame at index ﬁve
in Figure 4.5 correctly identiﬁed the technique instance. Figure 4.6 shows the ﬁve lines
of code selected in the disassembly view. However, unlike the previous cases, the DigR
disassembly does not show the SS register on lines 0x401005 and 0x401006 as coded in
Figure 2.4). Where a trained human reverse engineer may have missed the technique due
to missing SS label, REDIR found the technique because it focused on the Intermediate
Representation (IR) rather than the disassembled instructions.
Figure 4.5: Created frames during analysis of the MOV SS technique obfuscated by register
reassignment.
4.3.3.2 Source/Sink Identiﬁcation
TheMOV SS rule searches for source node that writes to the SS register and terminates
at a conditional jump sink node. The frame at index ﬁve begins at line 0x401005 and ends
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Figure 4.6: Highlighted DigR disassembly view of the MOV SS technique obfuscated by
register reassignment.
at 0x401014; this is correct for the MOV SS rule. The remaining frames matched other
instruction sets and continue on to the chop attempt.
4.3.3.3 Chop Identiﬁcation
For each index identiﬁed by the rule engine, REDIR attempted to chop the program
for that frame. Beginning with the source and sink nodes 0x401005 and 0x401014, index
ﬁve provided the correct source and sink nodes for iltrans to create a successful chop. By
eliminating the nop instructions, REDIR only selected the participating instructions from
the source to the sink. The other frames started by the rule engine were discarded since
they did not create valid chops.
4.3.3.4 Anti-debugging Technique Identiﬁcation
This sample contains only one implementation of the MOV SS technique. Index ﬁve
correctly identiﬁes the instance of the technique.
4.3.3.5 Jump Direction
Simulating a debugging condition by setting the Trap Flag (TF), the instrumented
evaluation identiﬁed that this program would take the jump (to line 0x401022) instead of
fall through to the next instruction (at line 0x401016).
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4.3.4 Test Case #4: PEB!IsDebugger/Code Transposition
4.3.4.1 Test Summary
The second test evaluated with the PEB!IsDebugger technique was paired with code
transposition and begins to demonstrate that REDIR can ﬁnd diﬀerent instances of the same
technique with only one rule. The frame at index ﬁve in Figure 4.7 shows the correctly
identiﬁed technique. Figure 4.8 shows just the four original lines of code selected in the
disassembly view. Aside from minor disassembly diﬀerences, this test case matches the
original sample perfectly (see Figure 2.2).
Figure 4.7: Created frames during analysis of PEB!IsDebugger technique obfuscated by
code transposition.
4.3.4.2 Source/Sink Identiﬁcation
The rule used for source/sink identiﬁcation in this case is the same as was used in the
ﬁrst evaluation (Section 4.3.1.2). The lines 0x40101a and 0x40100c created by the frame
at index ﬁve correctly match the rule engine to a FS access and a conditional jump. The
other frames matched with other instruction pairs and were evaluated in a chop attempt.
4.3.4.3 Chop Identiﬁcation
A chop for each of the frames captured by the rule engine was attempted. Despite the
source node’s appearance after the sink node, iltrans correctly chopped the program from
0x40101a to 0x40100c for the frame at index ﬁve. In the disassembly view, the uninvolved
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Figure 4.8: Highlighted DigR disassembly view of PEB!IsDebugger technique obfuscated
by code transposition. Jumps are illustrated for clarity beginning after line 0x40101a to the
terminating instruction at 0x40100c.
instructions are not selected since they do not aﬀect the outcome of the anti-debugging
technique. Without valid chops, the other frames started by the rule engine were discarded
correctly.
4.3.4.4 Anti-debugging Technique Identiﬁcation
As before, only one PEB!IsDebugger implementation was present in the program. The
frame at index ﬁve correctly identiﬁes that implementation.
4.3.4.5 Jump Direction
By simulating the debugging condition, REDIR correctly identiﬁed that using a
debugger would cause this program to take the jump (to line 0x401022) instead of falling
through to the next instruction (at line 0x40100e).
4.3.5 Test Case #5: RDTSC Timing/Instruction Substitution
4.3.5.1 Test Summary
Unlike the program in Figure 2.3, this sample uses diﬀerent instructions to achieve
the same functionality. The ﬁrst timing value was pushed to the stack instead inserting it
into a register. The cmp instruction was swapped out in favor of a sub instruction, and the
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conditional jump was negated to force a debugging condition to not jump. Despite those
changes, this test of the RDTSC Timing technique paired with instruction substitution
demonstrated REDIR’s resiliency to arbitrary obfuscation decisions. The frame at index
ﬁve in Figure 4.9 identiﬁes the correct anti-debugging instance. Figure 4.10 shows the nine
original lines of code selected in the disassembly view. Again, line for line, this test case
matches the original sample.
Figure 4.9: Created frames during analysis of RDTSC Timing technique obfuscated by
instruction substitution.
Figure 4.10: Highlighted DigR disassembly view of RDTSC Timing technique obfuscated
by instruction substitution.
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4.3.5.2 Source/Sink Identiﬁcation
As before, the rule engine searched for a pair of rdtsc instructions and a conditional
jump. At index ﬁve, the lines 0x401000 and 0x401011 correctly match the ﬁrst rdtsc
instruction and a conditional jump. Indexes zero through four matched similar instructions
and progressed on to the chop attempt.
4.3.5.3 Chop Identiﬁcation
Beginning with the source and sink nodes 0x401000 and 0x401011, the frame at index
ﬁve provided the correct source and sink nodes to create a successful chop. Despite the
obfuscation, iltrans was able to create a chop because the source and sinks provided by
REDIR correctly bounded this anti-debugging instance. The other frames did not provide
a valid chop and were discarded.
4.3.5.4 Anti-debugging Technique Identiﬁcation
REDIR correctly identiﬁed the RDTSC Timing implementation in the code sample.
The frame at index ﬁve correctly conﬁrmed the instance of the technique.
4.3.5.5 Jump Direction
Unlike the previous test cases, this example intentionally chooses to fall through to
the next instruction when sensing a debugger. With the simulated delay, the evaluation
correctly identiﬁed that the program would fall through (to line 0x401013) rather than
jump (to line 0x40101f).
4.3.6 Test Case #6: MOV SS/Opaque Predicate
4.3.6.1 Test Summary
This ﬁnal test case paired the well-disguised MOV SS anti-debugging technique with
a challenging opaque predicate obfuscation.
As before, the frame at index ﬁve in Figure 4.11 correctly identiﬁed the sought anti-
debugging instance. Figure 4.12 shows the 30 lines of code that span the technique from
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beginning to end. This view illustrates how other seemingly innocuous instructions can
exist within a technique to create a more sophisticated anti-debugging instance.
Figure 4.11: Created frames during analysis of PEB!IsDebugger technique obfuscated by
code transposition.
4.3.6.2 Source/Sink Identiﬁcation
With the same rule as before, the rule engine was able to ﬁnd a pair of instructions that
began with a source node writing to the SS register and terminating at a conditional jump
sink node. The frame at index ﬁve begins at line 0x401003 and ends at 0x401068; including
the opaque predicate code, this is correct for the MOV SS technique. With one exception,
the other frames were discarded after failing the chop attempt. Index six identiﬁed the
dummy code for the opaque predicate.
4.3.6.3 Chop Identiﬁcation
REDIR attempted to chop the program for each of the six frames generated by
the rule engine. Index ﬁve, beginning with the source and sink nodes 0x401005 and
0x401014, managed the correct source and sink nodes necessary for iltrans to create a
chop. Additionally, while REDIR was not designed to identify speciﬁc obfuscations it did
provide an important clue to the use of an opaque predicate. Closer inspection of the two
frames shows frame ﬁve is the same as frame six with two additional instructions. Index
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Figure 4.12: Highlighted DigR disassembly view of PEB!IsDebugger technique obfuscated
by code transposition.
six did lead to a valid chop, however the technique was not detectable. During debugging,
an analyst could use this clue to explore and conﬁrm the presence of an opaque predicate.
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4.3.6.4 Anti-debugging Technique Identiﬁcation
Again, just one MOV SS implementation was present in the program. Frame six was
eventually discarded when the evaluation could not detect the technique. The frame at
index ﬁve correctly identiﬁes that implementation.
4.3.6.5 Jump Direction
By simulating setting the TF, REDIR correctly identiﬁed that using a debugger would
cause this program to take the jump (to line 0x401086) rather than falling through to the
next instruction (at line 0x40106a).
4.4 Design and Implementation Analysis
REDIR excelled at many of the stated goals. The method for capturing detections
by the Data/Frame sensemaking technique seems to be a valid starting point for future
research. REDIR created and evaluated frames for correctness before employing more
demanding analysis steps. This approach greatly reduced the problem search space and
minimized expensive analysis steps by concrete evaluation.
REDIR oﬀered additional beneﬁts that were not originally intended. The original
design for conﬁrming the presence of an anti-debugging technique also oﬀered consistent
detection of a technique’s designed jump direction. Additionally, as evident in Test Case
#6 (Section 4.3.6), REDIR demonstrated value by oﬀering a clue for an analyst to explore
to conﬁrm an obfuscation.
Most REDIR analysis tasks completed in less than one second. However, due to the
less-than optimal multiple Virtual Machine (VM) architecture, execution time results could
not be viewed as meaningful metrics.
4.5 Experiment Summary
This research selected a test methodology to demonstrate the feasibility of static
analysis by sensemaking and IR analysis. In that task, the REDIR system was very
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successful. However, many other anti-debugging and obfuscation techniques exist. An
exhaustive test of all known techniques was beyond the scope of this project. Deﬁnitive
tests for real-world malware samples were impossible with static-only analysis, therefore
REDIR did not test real-world samples.
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V. Conclusion
5.1 Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the research conducted for this thesis.
Section 5.2 discusses the signiﬁcance of this research. Section 5.3 oﬀers new paths to
progress this research forward. Finally, Section 5.4 serves to summarize this entire research
eﬀort.
5.2 Research Signiﬁcance
As described previously, Reverse Code Engineering (RCE) is a time-consuming and
complicated task that requires a high level of education and expertise. Tools to help
RCE analysts conduct their work can make these analysts more eﬀective in their work.
Complicating the work of the RCE analyst, anti-debugging techniques compound the
diﬃculty of RCE. Tools exist to detect anti-debugging code but they are susceptible to
obfuscations. The purpose of REDIR is to detect anti-debugging techniques in obfuscated
code.
The REDIR system has managed to achieve its intended purpose. REDIR
has successfully detected three diﬀerent anti-debugging techniques in six diﬀerent
obfuscations. This success demonstrates the feasibility of the system and encourages
continued development.
Furthermore, REDIR has demonstrated the eﬀectiveness of three diﬀerent concepts
for RCE tasks. First, the Data/Frame sensemaking theory was justiﬁed as an eﬀective
method for growing possible detections into conﬁrmed detections. Next, the use of an
Expert System (ES), particularly a rule-based ES, made simple work of ﬁnding the minimal
heuristics of a technique for further processing. Finally, the Intermediate Representation
(IR) technology provided by the Binary Analysis Platform (BAP) framework successfully
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revealed the test programs inner workings and provided concrete evaluation that ultimately
made the detection conﬁrmations possible.
5.3 Future Research Recommendations
5.3.1 REDIR Enhancements
The REDIR system was designed to demonstrate the feasibility of a static, anti-
debugging detection system based on IR. As a result, the system is only partially
implemented. Several enhancements can be made to REDIR that will enable more
capabilities and approach commercial capabilities. Many others exist. REDIR should be
extended to detect more techniques. Some techniques were not possible due to limitations
imposed by the BAP framework. If BAP develops to handle cycles, REDIR can detect
techniques comprised of loops. When BAP can deploy to a Windows environment, REDIR
should be redesigned to eliminate the multiple Virtual Machine (VM) architecture.
REDIR’s rule engine implementation allows for the addition and removal of data
in working memory. Extending REDIR into dynamic analysis will mitigate the issue
with cycles. The DigR debugger can provide dynamic trace data while debugging. At
each breakpoint or single-step in the debugger, replacing the static IR with dynamic trace
data converted to IR will enable the re-ﬁring of rule engine rules with the possibility of
new detections. Advancing over cycles will replace loops with the sequence of executed
instructions. This enhancement will allow for detection of anti-debugging techniques that
form cycles, mitigation of obfuscations that employ cycles, and detection of decrypted or
decompressed of anti-debugging techniques. Furthermore, this modiﬁcation is supported
by the Data/Frame sensemaking process. The reframing step encourages the creation of
new frames by seeking additional data. Figure 5.1 depicts the REDIR concept through the
Data/Frame sensemaking process with the addition of dynamic trace data.
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Figure 5.1: REDIR concept through the Data/Frame sensemaking process with additional
dynamic trace data.
5.3.2 Test Corpus Development
During pilot experimentation, this research considered many other anti-debugging and
obfuscation technologies. However, a complete test corpus of all known technologies
was beyond the scope of this research. A complete test corpus would enable future
researchers to delay testing on real-world malware samples and focus on simple, provable
analyses. Additionally, other transformations such as encryption, packing, and integration
into existing programs could extend this test corpus and present a close to real-world
malware simulation. Lastly, working with real-world malware requires special handling
to prevent accidental execution on non-testing platforms. Extending this test corpus would
70
provide a known benign dataset. Test cases could be used during application development
without fear of malware infection.
5.3.3 Applications for Expert Systems Technologies in Reverse Code Engineering
Tasks
During the initial phases of this research eﬀort, numerous diﬀerent pairings of ES
and RCE were considered. The following subsections enumerate these research paths
to describe possible applications of ES in RCE based on strengths, weaknesses and
characteristics of each. This is not an exhaustive list of possible applications. Many of
the ES concepts can apply in various hybrid forms, and any of the issues around RCE can
merge into a single solution.
5.3.3.1 Ontology-Based Unpacker Tool
The use of packers is very common in malware development. Packers make analysis
very diﬃcult and consume a large portion of the reverse engineer’s time. Current techniques
for unpacking malware consist of manual debugging and automated scripts. Debugging
is time consuming and scripts are only useful for particular packers. Each time a new
packer is encountered, debugging and script development start over. Malware analysts
need a tool that can automate the debugging of any packed malware, including never before
encountered packers. Perhaps an ES-based unpacker could ﬁll this need.
An implementation for an ES-based unpacker would need to do several things. First,
it must formalize the knowledge of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Any ES technology
could accomplish this, but this requirement could be most easily and explicitly attained
in a rule-based or ontology-based knowledge. Once created, this data can be added to
the reasoner attached to a debugger program. The system must be capable of debugging
programs in execution to apply the knowledge as necessary to determine the Original Entry
Point (OEP) for the program. Each program the system will analyze will be diﬀerent; as
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a result, the use of the knowledge cannot be rigid. For this reason, an ontology-based tool
would be the best choice.
To mitigate the cost of creating the ontology, a complete ontology of all known
unpacking strategies and anti-reverse engineering techniques should not be attempted
at ﬁrst. Since diﬀerent packer implementations employ many of the same anti-reverse
engineering techniques, rules pertaining to unpacking should be added one packer at a
time. This strategy will be useful to cover the most commonly used anti-reverse engineering
ﬁrst. Subsequent additions to the ontology will require fewer additions to achieve the same
result. Future packers may require no additions at all as their anti-reverse engineering
strategies previously added to the ontology.
5.3.3.2 Intelligent Tutoring System For Teaching Reverse Code Engineering
Concepts
There are several common areas of knowledge deﬁciency for new RCE students [63].
They must learn assembly programming, compiler optimization behavior and other
specialized skills that typical Computer Science curriculum do not provide. The availability
of an Intelligent Tutoring System (ITS) in those areas would oﬀer the RCE student self-
paced, goal-oriented instruction. With the prerequisite instruction completed, the student
could begin RCE education. Additionally, ITS systems could aid the engineer in the
diﬃcult cognitive processes present in most reverse engineering tasks.
5.3.3.3 Modeling Domain Explicit Knowledge with Rule-Based Expert Sys-
tem
If-Then-Else logic used as a system’s knowledge base characterizes rule-based
systems. Simple, explicit RCE rules are programmable into the knowledge base for a rule-
based system. For example: a simple RCE task could be represented as a rule: ruleid:
If section encrypted then attempt decryption. Based on previous work done with
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rule-based systems such as the LISP tutor, a similar approach could be applied in a RCE
tutoring system [17].
5.3.3.4 Capturing Subject Matter Expert Knowledge with a Knowledge-Based
Expert System
Knowledge-based ES depend on quality domain knowledge from experienced sources.
Capturing this knowledge is the hardest part of building a knowledge-based system.
The knowledge of RCE experts has not been encapsulated in any knowledge base. A
knowledge-based tool with an integrated RCE tool interface could collect and learn expert
knowledge for later use.
5.3.3.5 An Ontology-Based Reverse Code Engineering Sensemaking System
Currently, there is not an ontology pertaining speciﬁcally to RCE. An ontology that
encapsulated and categorized the tools, techniques and foundational knowledge would
provide domain knowledge in an electronic form for use directly, or extracted from, to
create other RCE applications. Reverse engineers need better tools for documenting their
progress and sharing information [70]. An ontology-based documentation/collaboration
system could provide sensemaking assistance to help reverse engineers document solution
paths as they build a representative model of the system to share. Additionally, the ontology
could bridge knowledge and experience between reverse engineers and a sensemaking
system. The ontology would lay the foundation for the predictability between task workers
and the system required for an eﬀective sensemaking system.
5.3.3.6 Fuzzy Logic in a Knowledge Base Query Application
Usability is a critical design feature in all software applications. A knowledge base is
no good if the reverse engineer cannot construct queries that will provide the information
they are looking for. A query engine that will forgive spelling mistakes and oﬀer results
based on synonyms could provide best match results based on a human user’s input.
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5.3.3.7 Feature Recognition with Case-Based Reasoning
ACase-Based Reasoning (CBR) exploratory learning environment would be useful for
RCE feature recognition activities. Reverse engineers would be able to identify parts of a
program as new features. Once veriﬁed, those features could be added to the Database (DB)
of past cases of that particular feature. Future RCE applications could use that DB as the
foundation of automated feature detection.
5.3.3.8 De-obfuscation via Hidden Markov Models
Due to obfuscations and anti-reverse engineering techniques, frivolous instructions
intended to confuse the reverse engineer may be disguise common features of a program. A
system employing Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) could predict the presence of features
based on only partial sets of observations. Conﬁrmed instances could add to a database of
de-obfuscated “ﬁngerprints” for future use.
5.4 Summary
In conclusion, this research has covered numerous topics in an attempt to address
the problem of obfuscated anti-debugging techniques. The background and fundamentals
necessary to understand the problem and its possible solution were described in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 presented a solution to the problem and detailed its design, implementation and
method of testing. Subsequently, in Chapter 4, the experimentation results were presented
accompanied by analysis of the implementation and experimental method.
The problems facing those who perform RCE are not getting easier. To the contrary,
the domain is growing in complexity. The tools that reverse engineers depend on are not
keeping up with this trend. It is important to look at new methods for improving the way
that RCE is conducted. This research attempted to use a sensemaking strategy, driven by
a rule-based ES, employing IR analysis to do just that. Hopefully, this research will lead
to new RCE tools that incorporate proven technologies, such as ES and IR, to extend their
functionality and improve the performance of the reverse engineers that use them.
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